Introduction
Much has been written over the course of the last few years on the 'parting of ways' of the United States and the European countries on the themes of global security, war on terror and rogue states.
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The main objective of this paper is to discuss the security strategies and policies of both the US and the EU in the context of a North Africa country often ignored by the literature on the Middle East, but that is a key actor in the region and a potential paradigm of how relations between the US, the EU and Arab states could develop in the future. In this respect, we challenge the conventional wisdom surrounding the assumption that a rift in the transatlantic relationship exists. Our contentions is that despite minor tactical differences over methods, timing and 'reach', the United States and the European Union have virtually the same objectives in the region, operate under the same ideological assumptions, are bound by the same constraints and fall victim of similar contradictions. The level of economic, cultural and military integration between the US and the EU is such that rifts are no more than very short and superficial temporary crises. The global dominance that the two actors achieved over the last few decades through mutual cooperation is therefore unlikely to be undermined by conflict and competition. In order to test such a proposition the case of Tunisia is examined in some detail.
Context of Morocco's Stalled Democratization', Democratization, 12 (2005), pp. 548-566.
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US democracy promotion in the Middle East
US democracy promotion after September 11 2001 5
One of the most unanticipated aspects of the presidency of George W. Bush has been its association with the discourse of democracy promotion in the Middle East. Bush's accession to the office in 2000 was met with the expectation of a more isolationist and realist foreign policy that than conducted by his predecessor. The stated concerns of then National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice lay with the traditional foci of US foreign policy, namely Russia and China, and there was some expectation that the new administration would adopt a much more low-key approach to the problems of the Middle East than that of Bill Clinton. The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed all of this. One of the critical effects of those events was to direct American attention to the causes of the attacks and one of the conclusions that emerged from this reflection was that the absence of democracy in the Middle East/North Africa was now a primary concern of the United States. In the words of one commentator, it became necessary to 'drain the swamp' that incubated Islamist radicals such as Osama bin Laden. 6 In the period immediately after September 11, the Bush administration turned to its autocratic allies in the Middle East Thomas Carothers observes acerbically that this initial policy turn did not sacrifice any US commitment to democracy since for decades the US had already suppressed 6 course of time, a chorus of voices within and around the administration began to question the value of reliance on America's 'friendly tyrants '. 8 Carothers notes that the core idea of the new approach was to undercut the roots of Islamic extremism by 'getting serious' about democracy in the Arab world, not just in a slow, gradual way, but with 'fervour and force'. 'Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty'. human rights records… the war on terrorism will require it to downgrade its concern for human rights temporarily'.
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One of the results of this is what has been characterized as the 'instrumentalization' of democracy in US foreign policy. Rather the being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires. Dennis Ross, former 
Critical Perspectives
But, as with American policies on democracy promotion, the rhetoric of the EU in this area is belied by practice and the EMP also has been the object of very significant criticisms. Its development into the European Neighbourhood Policy seems equally unable to deliver on its promises. In the first place, a number of writers have observed on the lack of coherence that characterizes European interventions in this area. Despite attempts since the 1990s to forge a common European foreign and security policy, the reality is that 'Europe is still far from being a unitary actor'.
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Policy-making in these areas remains, for the most part, the preserve of the national governments of EU member states, which opens the way for separate actions by individual members parallel to common policies. The complex decision-making structures and processes of the EU further complicate efforts to achieve coherence and extremis backing up its objectives with effective force account for its being a far more potent influence in world affairs than the EU.
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A number of significant consequences flow from this. In the first place, the EMP places great emphasis on building partnerships with governments in the region.
Because, the EMP extends to so many areas where enhanced cooperation is sought
'it becomes very difficult to develop a democracy promotion strategy that does not conflict with efforts that require consent and collaboration in other areas'. 45 This, in turn, leads to a preference for a cautious bottom-up approach to political change which is expressed in support for civil society organizations.
However, the limitations of a bottom up, gradualist approach have been made clear.
EU strategy in this regard has been criticized for its flawed conception of civil society in the Middle East which is usually limited to secular, liberal groups, excluding those inspired by religious faith and the willingness to limit civil support to partners that are known to and approved of by 'partner' governments.
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One of the primary consequences of this approach is that the EU, like the United States, is exposed to the charge of double standards. Section Three: Tunisia -a missed opportunity for democratization
The contradictions and the complementary strategies of both the EU and US foreign policies towards democracy promotion are in evidence when it comes to the case of Tunisia.
At first glance, the country seems to offer the best potential for democratization in the entire Middle East and North Africa, which would lead one to assume that external forces might make a considerable difference in pressuring the leadership to end authoritarianism while, at the same time, promoting potential opposition actors.
Tunisia has a number of advantages over other countries in the region. Lebanon and 26 that the lack of political democratisation can be related to the hijacking of economic liberalisation, which strengthens authoritarianism rather than weakening it. What is contended here is that external actors facilitated such reinforcement of authoritarian rule by decreasing the costs of repression of the regime to such an extent that the paradox is that the regime is today rewarded precisely for remaining authoritarian.
The Tunisian Political System
For a year or so after coming to power in a bloodless coup in November 1987, it seemed that Bin Ali was setting about transforming the country and directing it away from its authoritarian past and towards a more inclusive and democratic future. One of his very first political moves was in fact to launch a political pact for democratization among all the political movements and parties that were active in Tunisia at the time including the Islamists. It's the economy stupid!
As mentioned earlier, one of the pillars of European democracy promotion in the region has been economic integration. While not offering the prospect of membership, the European Union believes that pro-market economic reforms will have beneficial repercussions in terms of democratization on authoritarian regimes. The logic therefore of partnership prevails among EU policy-makers who claim that it is through economic engagement that political developments will occur. In this context, grants and aid are offered to the target country to make the reforms necessary to be able to 'integrate' the regional economic exchanges. Such logic is based on the theory that economic advantages, which will inevitably occur in the target country after a period of 'adaptation', will create new centres of independent power that will make demands on the political system to reform and accommodate through democratic 
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Security first
The European Union has been traditionally more reluctant to co-operate openly and directly when it comes to hard security issues, but " the terrorist attacks of 11 As we can see, at the heart of US-Tunisian relations it should be the democratization of the country because, according to the Bush doctrine, it is only through democracy that terrorism will be ultimately defeated according to the Bush administration, but this does not happen. In fact, co-operation occurs in the military and intelligence domains, 
Conclusion
On a general, and regional, level, the asserted existence of a transatlantic rift seems to suggest that a 'softer' and meaningful alternative to US realpolitik in the Middle East exists, in the form of EU policies. All the evidence, as this paper has argued, is to the contrary. The strategies of both the US and the EU, despite some rhetorical differences, show very similar contradictions and inconsistencies because, fundamentally, they are both preoccupied with maintaining the status quo in the absence of a 'reliable' and pliable political opposition in the region. Those who argue that the rift between the US and the EU is irreparable and bound to characterise international politics in the future seem to miss the mark.
In addition, the evidence gathered indicates that the promotion of democracy, irrespective of the intentions of its promoters, takes the backseat when confronted with more 'realist' goals. While this might be satisfactory in the short-term as it seems to guarantee a positive outcome for both the EU and the US, the long-term effects of such a choice might be much more problematic. Specifically, all of the double-talk about democracy in the Middle East and North Africa has profound and negative domestic implications. In a country such as Tunisia, (but also in Egypt and elsewhere), it gives false hope to local activists and actors, while doing next to nothing to undo the structures which preclude meaningful popular political participation. In turn, this has three further effects. First, it brings the whole idea and the 'ideal' of democracy into disrepute thereby legitimising the ideological discourse of those who articulate the rejection of democratic governance. Second, it further diminishes the credibility of the United States and other Western actors as promoters/supporters of democracy in the region. Thus, even those who are favourable to a Western-style democracy feel compelled to distance themselves from 36 its external proponents. This makes both the US and the EU lose important constituencies. Finally, and paradoxically, the incumbent regimes continue to enjoy all the fruits of office, unchallenged by the very policies ostensibly designed as their undoing.
